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Abstract 
Performance management and decentralised decision-making are spreading 
through the Dutch education system. This study shows how performance 
management works and what actors and relationships between actors are 
important. Research has shown that performance management can easily lead to 
unintended and undesirable effects. The question remains how to reduce these 
effects. A comparison of policy programmes in other countries shows that the 
success of performance management is highly dependent on the form that it 
takes. Depending on circumstances, performance management can be a useful 
and worthwhile management mechanism. We conclude this paper by outlining a 
number of conditions for successful performance management. 
 
Introduction 
The rationale of educational institutions is based on their ability to give their 
students the best possible education and, if possible, to help them fulfil their 
potential. In order to achieve that, schools are subject to government control 
and management. There has been a shift in recent years in the division of roles 
between the government and society, with government pulling back to give 
more responsibility to society. While the national government aspires to become 
more accountable to its citizens, public and semi-public organisations are being 
required to demonstrate the results of their activities to their customers. 
Management based on rules and procedures is gradually being replaced by a 
system based on performance management and decentralised decision-making. 
This new style of management stems from New Public Management (NPM): a 
generic term for more performance-oriented management methods. What this 
body of ideas boils down to is: desegregation of organisations (increasing 
autonomy), greater freedom of control for managers, explicit performance 
indicators, output-based management and accountability mechanisms with 
incentives (Bestebreur 2003, CPB 2004). New Public Management aims to 
modernise management in public administration, using management mechanisms 
from the private sector (Hood, 1995). A second key idea of NPM is that 
management through rules and procedures should be replaced by management 
based on performance, with its associated decentralisation of powers (Budding & 
Groot 2003; Van Gestel & Teelken 2003).  
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The paper begins with a brief explanation of how performance management is 
put into practice, followed by an account of the pitfalls and dysfunctional 
effects of performance measurement and performance management. The 
question remains, how such effects can be reduced? After that we make a 
diversion to look at experiences with performance measurement abroad. Our 
literature study appears to indicate that performance measurement can be 
useful and worthwhile under certain circumstances. We conclude with a 
summary of recommendations for successful performance measurement and 
performance management. 
 
 
1. From management based on rules to management based on 
performance 
The present transition to a knowledge- or network-society means that 
governments are increasingly being seen as one player in a network. This is 
expressed in phenomena such as interactive policy and public-private 
cooperation on projects. The new role of government is shifting then toward 
that of director, regulator or chain manager. These are completely different 
images from those of the government paradigm, when officers were put in place 
as fearless helmsmen on the bow of the ship of state. The government is pulling 
back, giving service providers greater scope to develop and implement their own 
services, but in exchange for that the government expects measurable 
performance levels. 
 
The way this new approach to management is translated into reality is presented 
in Figure 1. This figure – borrowed from the CPB (2004) - presents the principal 
management, supervisory and accountability relationships in the Dutch 
education system. We added stakeholders to the figure, so that it reflects the 
actual situation in vocational education better. Stakeholders such as companies 
and social organisations have an important voice in the preparation of 
qualification profiles and vocational competence profiles, and they are also the 
place where students gain their first experience with their future occupations. 
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Figure 1 
Principal management, supervisory and accountability relationships in the Dutch 
education system (based on Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB), 2004)  
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These questions serve as a guide for both the preparation of policy and for the 
account of policy given in the annual report produced by each ministry. For the 
preparation of policy via the budget, the division of the policy section into a 
policy agenda and policy items is an important innovation. The policy agenda 
contains a brief outline of the key points of a minister’s policy for the coming 
year. It also indicates the most important developments in the policy to be 
pursued: which policies should be strengthened and which relaxed or scrapped? 
  
The aim is to condense the policy into 10 policy items or policy areas. For each 
policy area, the policy agenda should indicate: 
• what the objectives of government policy in that area are, these should 
be formulated in terms that are as concrete and measurable as possible; 
• what instruments will be used and/or what activities will be carried out in 
order to realise the policy; and  
• the funding required (Ministry of Finance 2002).  
A more complete account of policy, performance and funding is given in the 
departmental annual report, which answers the questions: Have we achieved 
what we planned? Have we done what we should have done? And did it cost what 
we expected it to cost? The annual reports must be submitted to Parliament by 
the third Wednesday in May at the latest.  
   
The formulation of system indicators is another example of this. There are also 
more and more examples of the government formulating performance targets or 
ambitions for funded institutions that serve as a guideline for the performance 
levels to be realised by institutions. Local authorities as policy-makers are 
missing from the overview; in their role as governing bodies for public 
education, they can be placed in institutions.  
 
In block B (institutions) performance makes its appearance again in the form of 
management contracts and possibly team and/or individual performance-related 
pay. Institutions can use performance levels (such as success rates, inspection 
assessments) as indicators of quality in their communications with stakeholders, 
students and the general public. The arrows between A and B are more 
interesting here. Performance-related funding has existed in certain education 
sectors for quite some time. More recently, the government’s maxim has been: 
national ambitions, regional performance levels. Adult and vocational education 
institutions are used as regional leverage to mobilise and organise networks with 
stakeholders in order to convert national ambitions into performance.  
 
This approach to management can be seen again in the way the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science makes agreements with institutions about policy 
objectives to be realised (performance agreements) and with the supervisory 
bodies about how this will be checked (protocols). This starts with making clear 
agreements at the beginning of the policy cycle about the “what” aspect, 
leaving it to the institutions themselves to fill in the “how”. The minister is 
responsible for the whole system and for creating the space, frameworks, 
conditions and sufficient checks and balances (Ministry of OCW, 2004a, b). 
  
These basic principles are highlighted again in the Adult and Vocational 
Education Strategy. The national government has chosen a management style 
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that involves laying down clear frameworks in advance and a combination of 
horizontal and vertical accountability afterwards. The Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science is strengthening internal supervision and horizontal 
(multiple public) accountability, alongside the existing vertical accountability. A 
constant theme running through this is the proportional supervision laid down in 
the Education Inspection Act (WOT). This means: more supervision where quality 
and internal monitoring is still inadequate and less supervision as quality and 
monitoring improve. According to the Adult and Vocational Education Strategy, 
it will be a challenge to apply this principle more widely as its legitimacy is 
monitored. The better the horizontal supervision, the less emphasis there will be 
on vertical supervision, but this does not mean that vertical supervision will 
disappear altogether. In the 2005 budget for vocational and adult education, 
reference is made to ambitions at national and even European level that will 
have to be expressed quantitative and qualitative targets, as agreed at Lisbon 
(2004). The immediate future will be a period for experimenting. The plan is 
that from the 2005-2006 course year, educational institutions will specify and 
report on their ambitions in conjunction with their regional networks. For the 
time being, the emphasis will be on greater transparency aimed at the local 
environment and benchmarking, rather than really judging institutions by their 
results. There is still no question of differential salary schemes or funding 
arrangements.  
 
In Dutch Higher education, the structure of finance is increasingly based on an 
output-oriented basis. Universities are obliged to produce more detailed yearly 
reports, including their goals and mission, their expectations for the future, 
educational and research results, human resource management, financial 
situation including ratio’s, output features (graduation rates e.g.) which should 
help the reader to judge the actual quality of the university (Ministry of OCW, 
2003). 
 
Students1 - we have arrived at block C – may choose a particular course partly on 
the basis of the quality of the course as indicated by performance data. The 
school report cards used in secondary education are a familiar example. League 
tables of courses published in Trouw or Elsevier are another example. The 
general public is interested in whether the government is living up to its 
promises, such as the promise to provide high quality education. The press 
likewise has its own reasons to be interested in the performance of public 
services. Finally, block D: the Inspectorate has a supervisory role and so 
monitors the performance of institutions and reports on its findings in the annual 
Education Report, based on the school report cards.  
 
This brief overview illustrates that performance is being defined in many 
different forms at all kinds of levels. Figure 1 shows the following relationships 
between the different actors: 
1. Legislation on attainment targets or exit qualifications (the influence of 
national government on the institutions, a top-down approach therefore). 
                                                          
1 From senior secondary vocational education upwards it is the students themselves, parents have a more 
limited role in view of the age of the students. 
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2. Process control via funding (two-way relationship between institutions and 
the government, bottom-up and top-down). 
3. Provision of information to students/parents, e.g. via school prospectus (the 
influence of the institutions on students/parents). 
4. Choices made by students/parents (the influence of students/parents on the 
institutions). 
 
This study is confined to performance management by the government (block A), 
aimed at vocational education institutions (block B including the relationship 
between A and B). The other parts of the figure will only be touched upon in 
passing. However, there is also a restriction applying to blocks A and B: this 
paper does not consider performance management via team or individual pay (as 
an aspect of personnel policy, for example) in government departments or 
educational institutions. We do, however, consider cases where it is government 
policy to give extra financial rewards to institutions if they demonstrate certain 
performance levels.  
 
2.  Pitfalls and dysfunctional effects of performance management 
and  performance measurement 
 
Measurement is controversial in the public sector, as is evident from the many 
discussion documents and studies on this issue. The main objection is that many 
achievements in the public sector are invisible, unplanned or inconsistent 
(Noordergraaf & Abma 2003), because intended results are often problematic 
and means-end relationships are unclear, as are the relationships between 
benefits and undesirable effects. 
 
De Bruijn (2004, p. ?) warned about the paradox of performance measurement: 
“Performance measurement is tempting to many a manager: it seems to offer 
many opportunities for managing professionals, but anyone who over-uses this 
set of tools will bring down the negative effects on his own head. So 
performance measurement is a tricky proposition for the manager: it promises to 
strengthen his capacity to intervene, but only those who use it carefully will 
realise something of what it appears to promise. If performance measurement 
falls into the hands of the modern macho manager, with his present-day jargon 
of ‘effectiveness’, ‘performance-related pay’ and similar robust notions, then 
the system of performance measurement very soon becomes perverted and 
degraded into bureaucracy and pointless ritual”.  
 
Performance management and measurement in the public sector is no simple 
matter, because it can easily lead to unintended and undesirable effects and 
even to De Bruijn’s “pointless ritual”. A common example of this is strategic 
behaviour, where people try to uncouple the performances that are to be 
measured from the actual functioning of their organisation. By excluding certain 
groups of students, for instance, a school can improve the statistics for its final 
examination results. When courts are assessed on the basis of the number of 
judgements they pass, they can increase the number of interim judgements in 
order to increase their output figures. The threat of sanctions (e.g. budget 
limits) resulting from performance management almost inevitably leads to 
 7
dysfunctional behaviour. There is a serious danger that the emphasis on 
“productivity” and “efficiency” will ultimately be initiated more with cutting 
budgets in mind rather than improving performance. The consequences are 
correspondingly serious: “Equating performance measurement with budget 
cutting creates a perversion of incentives that rewards obfuscation and self-
protection rather than creative performance improvement” (op. cit., 233) Klay 
(2003). 
 
Another important problem with performance management is that public 
services are usually complicated and multifaceted and so they cannot be 
reduced to a single dimension, which is often the presumption with performance 
management. A third problem is that administration costs are high, because 
accurate and effective measurement of performance takes a lot of time and is 
expensive. This is sometimes referred to as the “the burden of accountability” 
(Power, 2003).These three pitfalls are discussed in turn below, and this section 
concludes with a brief look at the effects of performance management over a 
longer period. 
2.1. Dysfunctional effects 
Performance management and performance measurement can have all kinds of 
undesirable effects that are not intended. Smith (1995) was one of the first to 
point out the pitfalls of performance measurement. He identified eight 
dysfunctional effects:  
a. Tunnel vision: in situations where there are several targets, managers choose 
those that are easiest to quantify. 
b. Suboptimalisation: managers operate in a way that helps them to achieve 
their own targets but is counterproductive for the overall system.  At system 
level this means that output measurement can contribute to greater 
competitiveness between organisations, leading to increased reluctance to share 
best practices because this could harm the organisation's own competitive 
position. In this situation, increased output in the individual organisation is at 
the expense of a decrease in the output of the system.  
c. Myopia (= short-sightedness): is found when managers choose short-term 
rather than long-term gains. 
d. Measure fixation: if outcomes are difficult to measure there is a natural 
tendency to use performance indicators that are based on quantifiable outputs. 
Measure fixation occurs when the performance indicator itself becomes the 
focus point and the desired outcome gets pushed into second place. An example 
would be provided by universities where knowledge is constantly reproduced to 
increase output, but innovation is blocked in the long term. 
e. Misrepresentation: this is a form of fraud and takes place when performance 
data are either reported inaccurately or deliberately manipulated in order to 
create a good impression. In schools, there is cherry picking: weaker pupils are 
not allowed to take tests, making the results in the official reports on the school 
look better. Another strategy is counselling, in which poorly performing students 
are encouraged to leave school early. A third example is teaching-to-the-test: 
pupils are trained to pass the tests that the school knows will be published in 
reports that are available to the public. 
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f. Misinterpretation: this manifests itself most obviously in league tables, in 
which the measurements are often so imprecise that they do not allow proper 
comparison. 
g. Gaming: this is when a manager deliberately underperforms in order to be 
ensured of a lower target in the next round. 
h. Ossification: this happens when performance indicators cease to be relevant, 
but no-one takes the trouble to revise or remove them. 
 
 
2.2 Multifaceted character of public services 
De Bruijn concluded that output measurement in public sector organisations 
calls up an ambivalent picture. That is not surprising, given that public sector 
organisations (including schools) are producing multi-value products. The 
products have to do justice to the different values that are sometimes 
incompatible or inconsistent. Furthermore, output measurement reduces multi-
value achievements to single value achievements. The professionals therefore 
see performance measurement as a poor way of judging things because it is one-
dimensional.  
 
Bouckaert & Peters (2002), continuing on the same theme, argued that new 
public performance management risks creating an illusion of greater control over 
aspects that can be controlled and better results on details, while losing sight of 
important social issues. “A ‘helicopter view’ is competing with a detailed and 
sometimes myopic ‘frog view’ for a performance management approach”. You 
only measure what you can in fact measure, and these are often unimportant 
matters that are easier to measure than the important ones, so performance 
management necessarily involves the danger that people will normally 
concentrate on targets that are fairly easy to reach (Klay 2003). 
 
Performance management and performance measurement require investigations 
to be carried out among stakeholders to find out how satisfied they are with 
services. Citizens are key stakeholders in the public sector and perceptions and 
expectations play a big role in levels of satisfaction. The way achievements are 
presented will influence those perceptions and expectations, and so there is a 
danger that the performance itself will become less important than the 
presentation of the performance. 
 
The final effects of government interventions (the outcome) are also often 
difficult to measure because the goals of government interventions are often 
necessarily vague and therefore difficult to put into operation (safety, quality, 
integration). De Bruijn argues that because of the complicated nature of public 
service, many organisations elect to manage based on output rather than 
outcome: scientific papers, police charges, court judgements, medical 
treatments, licenses issued. The output of an organisation only gives a limited 
picture of the performance of that organisation. Despite this limitation, output 
is often an easier instrument for management to use than outcome, because 
outcomes are far more difficult to measure.  
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2.3 Administration costs 
As stated earlier, accurate and effective measurement of performance demands 
a great deal of effort. It is usually the professional or operational staff who are 
putting in the effort, while the managers get the benefit from the information. 
De Bruijn pointed out that the total time between the intervention and the final 
effect is often long and this effect is influenced by innumerable other factors, so 
it is difficult to find objective evidence of the relationship between the 
government intervention and the final effect. 
 
Bouckaert & Peters (2002) challenged the view that performance-based 
management has advantages for policy-makers, managers and the general 
public. They argued that the costs will rise but that it is difficult to make these 
costs transparent. The use of performance contracts, for instance, means that 
energy has to be invested in drawing up the contracts and in discussing the right 
levels of performance, then performance has to be monitored and evaluated. 
The alternative is to invest in trust, which – certainly in the public sector -  is 
cheaper and more sustainable (Boeckaert & Peters, 2002). 
 
2.4 Long-term effects 
The Social Development Council (RMO) has voiced concerns about the pitfalls of 
the new management approach, from which can be concluded that performance-
based management can have undesirable effects in the longer term. There is a 
danger that the government will withdraw the scope for policy-making again 
with “monitoring, controls and accountability”. Monitoring and controls can have 
negative effects: an enlarged bureaucratic measurement industry, manipulation 
of figures, encouragement of short-term thinking, calculation instead of 
aspiration and declining professional responsibility (De Bruijn 2001). This can 
lead to transference and duplication of bureaucracy, when the broader policy 
frameworks of the national government are being “closely regulated” again at 
other levels. The idea that “all competence disputes, conflicts of interest and 
grey areas can be regulated out of existence” through frameworks is an illusion 
(RMO, 2003).  
 
Bouckaert & Peters (2002) argued that a new divide between winners and losers 
has been created by this new method of management. Every organisation and 
every nation aspires to excellence, wants to be in the vanguard, wants to 
function in accordance with best practice. The top is frequently not high 
enough. It is obvious that only a few can reach the top and what is the top now 
may only be middling tomorrow. There is a danger that all the attention is 
focused on the excellent, while the less than excellent are left out in the cold 
and become demotivated, when some of them are putting in a good 
performance in the circumstances in which they are operating.  
 
The key question of whether public administration run along performance 
management lines really is more efficient and offers better quality services to 
the public has not, therefore, been answered. Pollitt & Bouckaert (2003) rightly 
ask how it can be that proponents of performance management reforms show so 
little interest in their own performance. They suggest that proponents of NPM 
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are caught up in a kind of religion rather than following a collection of scientific 
principles that can be tested by research. An interesting aspect of the belief in 
NPM is the connection with long-established views about the nature of liberal 
democracy. “Nowadays we hear a great deal about citizens’ charters, 
‘empowerment’, ‘inclusion’, ‘partnership’, ‘networked solutions’ and 
‘accountability’. Governments present management reforms as being at one 
with a more guiding, less authoritarian, more cooperative, less exclusive role for 
themselves. (…) However, it is clear that NPM believers have felt a need to 
acknowledge and ally themselves with the continuing power of the ‘old 
religion’”.  
 
3. Experiences with performance management 
Studies in the private sector (De Waal et al. (2001) who refer to a benchmark 
study by Arthur Andersen) have found that organisations that focus on 
performance management are not only more successful financially, but they are 
also more innovative and produce better quality work that companies that do 
not. 
 
Based on empirical studies, Neely et al. (2004) reported that the Balanced Score 
Card (shortened to BSC, one of the best-known innovative performance 
management systems) had been introduced by 44% of organisations worldwide by 
2001. The most widespread introduction was in the United Kingdom (57%), more 
than in the United States (46%), and both were leading Germany and Austria 
(26%). Surveys have been conducted by firms of consultants and market research 
bureaus, which have found that organisations that work with balanced 
performance measurement systems perform better that those which do not. 
Research findings indicate that organisations that make greater use of financial 
as well as non-financial assessment criteria and link strategic criteria to 
operational criteria make higher profits. A well-designed Balanced Score Card 
can, in this way, help an organisation to picture and improve its performance 
and profitability (Neely et al., 2004, Epstein et al., 2004). Dutch research 
findings point in the same direction: use of the BSC increases organisational 
effectiveness, provided plenty of attention is given to implementation (Braam & 
Nijssen 2004). There are other studies, however, that contradict these findings. 
A similar mixed picture emerges from research designed to investigate whether 
performance measurement increases employees’ job satisfaction. There are 
signs that the process of identifying and selecting suitable performance criteria 
and key performance indicators leads to employees being more ready to accept 
the business strategy, more strongly committed to its introduction and having a 
better understanding of what is going on in the company.  
 
De Waal & Kerklaan (2003) reported as the most significant conclusion to emerge 
from evaluations of projects abroad “that performance management in public 
administration does work”.  Effective performance management leads to 
improved results from public sector organisations and so it strengthens 
democracy. This is true of both local authorities and national government. They 
referred in this context to a study from the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government entitled: Visions of governance in the 21st century.  
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The education systems of many countries are increasingly being organised along 
performance management lines. In very general terms, two models of public 
management can be distinguished. The first is the constitutional state model, 
that is based on the state as an integral power, usually with a  bureaucratic 
culture. Germany and France are typical examples of countries that operate this 
model. The second model is the public interest model, in which the state is seen 
as a necessary evil with only limited decision-making powers, typified by the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Performance management is only 
slowly taking shape in the constitutional state countries, but is gaining ground 
much faster in the countries that operate a public interest model. There are also 
countries, such as the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, that operate a hybrid 
model. 
Examples of policy programmes based on performance management are: the 
Best Value programme, performance management in primary and secondary 
education and school achievement awards in the United Kingdom; the 
Government Performance and Results Act in the United States; and the 
Outcomes and Outputs Framework in Australia. We have not been able to find 
any evaluations of the last two policy programmes. 
 
Experience with performance management within the two most important 
relationships as presented in Figure 1 will be discussed in turn. 
 
1. Legislation on attainment targets or exit qualifications (the influence of 
national government on the institutions, mainly top-down) 
 
In the United Kingdom local authorities have been required to take part in the 
Best Value programme since 1 April 2000. This programme means that local 
authorities lay down their own performance criteria over a broad range of tasks 
and constantly measure themselves up against these criteria. The programme 
was introduced in a typically top-down way. Longitudinal research (Martin et al. 
2003) found that the results of this programme were not clear, implementation 
had not been easy but had usually had a stimulating effect. Remarkably, the 
programme has led to more central control, contrary to the intentions of NPM 
(Wollmann 2004). The Balanced Score Card is seen as an important tool here. 
 
Another programme in England is Performance Management in Schools, whereby 
all state primary and secondary schools are required by law to introduce 
performance management (Brown 2004). In this programme, school governing 
bodies make performance agreements with heads and teachers about school 
leadership, pupils’ attainment levels, etc. The results of performance appraisals 
of both groups work through to salaries. Research findings indicate that heads 
and school governors often do not feel equipped to apply this system of 
performance appraisal (Brown 2004). Major differences have also been found 
between schools in the way and the extent to which they apply this system, for 
example, in how specific and objective their performance levels are .  
 
In Canada, certain services provided by local authorities (road maintenance, 
waste disposal, water supplies) are increasingly being managed on a 
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performance basis. A survey of Canadian local government officials (n=895, 
response 37%) found that there are still major differences between desired and 
actual use of performance measurement, especially measurement of 
effectiveness. Nevertheless performance measurement systems are seen as a 
useful management tool with  interesting potential for further development. 
(Pollanen, 2002) 
 
Experiences with performance management in the local government of Alberta,  
reported on in research conducted by Townley et al. (2003), were less positive. 
Although the new approach to management was greeted with enthusiasm, the 
results were disappointing. The groups of experts who had devised the 
performance indicators had little feeling for the professional knowledge and 
skills of the operational managers, while the government of Alberta was only 
interested in the simple, standardised information. This led to a culture of 
calculation and the measures got bogged down in a mechanistic use of 
performance reports and outcome indicators. Try & Radnor (2004) came up with 
similar findings in their study of Canadian Results Based Management (RBM). It 
does not seem to be easy to convert a traditional bureaucratic culture with fixed 
input and processes into a result-oriented culture; the environment is not 
flexible enough to give output management a chance. 
 
2. Process control via funding (the two-way relationship between institutions 
and government, with both a top-down and bottom-up approach) 
 
Noden et al. (1999) compared the higher education systems of Finland and the 
United Kingdom, based on the assessment methods used and performance-
related funding. The universities in both countries tended to implement the 
national system at the level of the organisation. Because so much attention was 
given to the Research Assessment Exercise in the UK (assessment of the quality 
of research by peer review), other areas were neglected. Extra funding for 
excellent teaching  (Teaching Quality Assessment) was given much less attention 
and was not considered acceptable (because it was felt to be unfair to students). 
The planned introduction of tuition fees to be paid direct to the universities 
should compensate to some extent for the over-concentration on research. In 
Finland, there was greater use of output-based funding, which was putting 
pressure on the quality of teaching (more very large colleges) and research 
(lower quality standards for doctoral theses, narrowing of research fields). On 
the other hand, more attention was being paid to efficiency and cost control. 
 
Lawrence & Sharma (2002) carried out case studies into the use of BSC at the 
University of the Fuji Islands. This management model was introduced there 
under pressure and it involves funding based on quasi-market elements and 
performance-based management of academics and their departments. Lawrence 
and Sharma found, however, that BSC promoted efficiency and effectiveness but 
in doing so was failing certain essential aspects of education. When education is 
seen as a product to be traded (commodification) and students are seen as 
customers, the function of education in society is degraded. 
 
Davis and Albright (2004) used a quasi-experimental setting and found that BSC 
improved financial performance in the banking system. Of course, the question 
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remains whether it is possible to generalise from this study and whether the 
improvement will be lasting or only temporary. 
 
We have been looking at experiences with performance management in other 
countries; unfortunately the studies are too few and far between and too 
anecdotal to allow general conclusions to be drawn from them.  
 
4. Possible solutions 
It seems that performance management works in public administration but that 
its success is highly dependent on the conditions under which it is organised as 
well as the basis on which it is organised (De Waal & Kerklaan 2003). 
 
Experiences with the new policy and management system (Beleids- en 
Beheersinstrumentarium (BBI) in Dutch, one of the first initiatives for a different 
kind of management in local government) have taught us that, as well as 
attention to quality, use and the effect of new management tools, at least the 
same amount of attention needs to be given to the  “softer” aspects of 
management, such as changing culture and attitudes.  The evaluation of the 
VBTB (IOFEZ, 2004) showed that progress was being made in the area of 
accessibility and efficiency of the policy agenda, such as a clearer structure for 
budget items and more fluent budget report. Despite these improvements, many 
faults and inadequacies were still noted. There were complaints, for instance, 
that it is difficult to achieve two goals (accessibility and efficiency) with one 
instrument (the budget structure). It seems as if the “VBTB reduces everything 
to measurable quantities” (p. 42). Numerous recommendations are being made 
to improve the accessibility of budgets, accountability through reporting and 
efficiency, by making the VBTB more concrete and ceasing to use the same 
instrument for different purposes. There is also a proposal to set up “a 
programme for a small number of high quality studies to evaluate the effects of 
policy, based on the proposed policy analyses and with the aid of experts in the 
field” (IOFEZ, 2004, p. 54). 
 
The findings of this study indicate that performance management can be useful 
and worthwhile under certain circumstances, but that we should not expect too 
much from it. The form the performance measurement system takes and the 
method of introduction are crucial. It is important, for instance, that the multi-
value character of public service be recognised, particularly when drawing up 
performance indicators. Attention must be given not only to output, but also to 
the process and the factors that, to a greater or lesser extent, contributed to 
the results.  De Bruijn argues that measuring output in the case of multi-value 
products can only lead to less perverse behaviour when output is seen in relation 
to throughput; in other words, when the product is linked with the production 
process. However, the product approach can also lead to perverse effects. It is 
about utilising the tension between the two approaches: management of 
competing values. 
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Learning from performance is more important than judging institutions on the 
basis of their performance. Support from management personnel is essential 
when implementing performance management. Employees and managers have to 
be involved in the choice of performance indicators, the evaluation of outcomes 
and the choice of subsequent activities. The manner of its introduction is crucial 
to the success of the Balanced Score Card, for instance. This kind of dialogue 
reinforces the interests of the customer (= student) and the employee (=teacher) 
behind the data and prevents performance management becoming an end in 
itself. 
 
On the basis of our study we have identified two modes of performance 
management, controlling and learning performance management. Both possess 
different features, which are summarized in the following table.  
 
Table 2: Modes of Performance management 
Dimensions: Controlling Learning 
Support By management By management and 
operational staff 
Steering Top-down Top-down-up 
Establishment of 
performance 
indicators 
By management By means of a dialogue 
between management and 
operational staff 
Embeddedness of 
performance 
indicators 
Independent of context Dependent of the context 
Nature of performance 
indicators 
Quantitative Quantitative as well as 
qualitative 
View on policy process Reduction of activities 
into one-dimensional 
entities 
Taking into account the multi-
value character 
Accountable units Individual level Team or organisation, as 
system level 
Perspective of time Past A combination of Past, 
present and future= flow 
Basis of performance 
management 
Based on only little 
trust 
Based on extensive mutual 
confidence and trust 
Dimension Product Attention for Product and 
Process 
Position of reviewer External reviewer Internal monitor/reviewer 
Role of stakeholder Passive Encouraging, coaching 
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5. Conclusions & recommendations 
1.From this account of different experiences it is evident that management 
based on performance is a balancing act. The danger that performance 
management will not lead to the desired behaviour but will elicit strategic 
behaviour is always lurking in the background. It is not possible to come up with 
a clear-cut prescription to make performance management a success. However, 
the experiences discussed in this paper allow us to offer some advice for 
performance management in public administration. 
  
1. Organisations in general and public sector organisations in particular carry 
out activities and provide services that have a multi-value character. These 
often involve conflicting or inconsistent matters that cannot easily be reduced to 
one-dimensional proportions, while indicators do presume one-dimensionality. If 
performance management and performance measurement fail to take this 
sufficiently into consideration, there will be a strong tendency among staff to 
resort to dysfunctional or strategic behaviour.  
 
2. When performance levels are the only aspect taken into account, this can 
also encourage dysfunctional behaviour. Public sector organisations employ 
professionals who engage in all kinds of interactions and who sometimes have to 
take decisions which may appear inconsistent. A surgeon treats different kinds of 
patients and it may be easier for him to reach his performance targets with one 
patient than with another. A performance measurement system that is based 
exclusively on quantifiable performance levels will be seen as unfair by the 
professional. The system needs to allow room for dialogue to get to the bottom 
of processes and factors that lead to specific levels of performance. The right 
balance needs to be found between a product-based and process-based 
approach.  
 
3. If performance management is not to remain confined to managers, if the 
professionals are also to be drawn in (cascading), then steps must be taken to 
ensure support for the measures. One way to do this is to actively involve “the 
shop floor” in the choice of performance indicators, evaluating outcomes and 
making agreements on any consequences of the evaluation. It must be borne in 
mind that switching from a rule-led to a performance-led culture is a long-
drawn-out process.  
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4. Performance management that is accompanied by sanctions encourages 
strategic behaviour by definition, especially when there are financial 
consequences. Managers often respond to strategic behaviour by refining the 
performance measurement system. This is a blind alley. It is far more fruitful to 
adopt a learning approach: how can we learn from performance management 
and how can we improve it through dialogue? That demands that attention be 
given to the story behind the performance, without playing down the importance 
of delivering the performance.  
 
It is always necessary to seek a balance between the extra gains to be made by 
introducing performance management and the extra administration costs, not 
merely the actual financial costs but the additional burden of administration as 
well. The process of introducing performance management should always 
include a consideration of this balance. 
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